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THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 
HE years which lay between the Congress of Paris and T the Congress of Berlin were more crowded with great 
events than any twenty years in the history of the world. T h e  
two ideas of democracy and nationality had gone hand in hand 
during the middle years of the century. T o  men like Met- 
ternich they had seemed the inseparable and baneful product 
of the revolution. They had been glorified together, by 
Mazzini and Garibaldi and the F e n  of I 848, under the name 
of liberty. T h e  members of the Parliament of Frankfort of 
1850 had believed in their unity, and had dreamed of an 
empire which was to rest upon them as upon twin founda- 
tions. But Frederick William, under the pressure of Austria 
and Russia, had refused a crown which was to belong to  him, 
not “by the grace of God,” but “by the will of the people,” 
and men who hated both political and economic democracy 
were to seize the idea of nationality and to use it as a 
weapon. Kossuth and Andrassy had shown that the two 
ideas were not necessarily consistent when they had used the 
fervor of the February revolution, not so much to  secure 
popular rights and privileges for the people of Hungary, 
as to increase the relative power and influence of the Mag- 
yars at the expense of the Slavs who lived with them in the 
valley of the middle Danube. T h e  separation had been 
made complete by Bismarck, who was as patriotic as Maz. 
zini and as reactionary as Metternich. H e  was at once the 
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heir of the liberals of 1848, and of the conservative forces 
which had destroyed them. 
T h e  political thought of the age had been profoundly 
though unconsciously affected by the idea of the survival of 
the fittest, which it took from its biological setting and gave 
a social significance. Evolution seemed a blind force which 
always worked through struggle and never through what 
has since come to be called “mutual aid.” When pressed to  
define “the fittest,’’ the age would have answered, *‘Those 
that survive,” without realizing either the shallowness of the 
answer or  the circle in the reasoning. I t  was a frank gospel 
of salvation to the strong and of damnation to  the weak, 
because weakness is the self-evident proof of unfitness. Her-  
bert Spencer was to  be regarded as a profound thinker 
whose influence was to reappear in a positive way in  
Nietzsche, and negatively and more popularly in Omar 
Khayyam. T h e  notions of a common humanity whose needs 
and aspirations must be considered, of popular rights, of 
international justice or  morality, seemed now mere senti- 
ment and cant. Organized efficiency within the nation, im- 
perialism in international relations, were to be the frank out- 
ward expression of subtle and profound changes in the 
religious and social thought of men. Pan-Slavism, Pan- 
Germanism, T h e  White Man’s Burden, were to be the new 
cloaks for the same old selfishness and greed which had once 
paraded under other names ; and in the name of the liberal 
notion of nationality, national interests were to be disre- 
garded and popular liberties suppressed. 
T h e  Europe which turned its eyes to  Berlin was a very 
different Europe from that which had breathed a profound 
sigh of relief a t  the end of the Crimean war. Italy had then 
been a hope and Germany scarcely more than an aspiration. 
Now Italy had gained her freedom, not as the result of any 
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great popular rising as Mazzini had hoped, but by the aid 
of foreign soldiers. Whatever gratitude she had first felt 
for  France was dimmed and almost destroyed when Napo- 
leon had secured first the hand of the Princess Clotilde for  
his cousin, and had later gained his pound of flesh in Savoy 
and Nice. Well might Garibaldi fulminate against the bar- 
gain which made him a man without a country, but Cavour 
answered that “statesmanship is the ability to  discern the 
possible.” T h e  great Italian had died with Venice still un- 
redeemed, and with Rome protected by the bayonets of 
France. T h e  final and complete unification of Italy was to  
be the work, not of Napoleon or  of Cavour, but of Bis- 
marck, as a by-product of his struggle against Austria. 
After the death of Cavour, the career of Bismarck was, 
indeed, “the history of Europe.’’ Under  him the Prussian 
army had been strengthened, even against the will of the 
Assembly, and that army had been used in three successful 
wars. First Denmark had been beaten and compelled to  
give up SchleswigHolstein ; then Austria had succumbed to 
the well-trained soldiers of Von Moltke, and Hanover, 
which since the Congress of Vienna had virtually cut Prussia 
off from any direct access to the sea, was swallowed bodily; 
and then, a t  length, Prussia was strong enough to  fight 
France for Alsace and Lorraine, with their rich valleys and 
almost priceless coal-fields. T h e  great indemnity of five 
billions of francs which the defeated country had to pay for 
the privilege of being beaten was at once the symbol of the 
completeness of the victory and the foundation of great 
national enterprises fo r  Germany. In all former wars the 
victor had been content with either land o r  money. In this 
he demanded both, and the gains which were made so easily 
in I 87 I became the temptation which seems the fundamental 
cause of the present war. In  money alone Germany had 
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gained much more than she had spent. W a r  seemed at  once 
glorious and lucrative. Above all, the three southern states, 
which had held aloof at first, were now willing to  come into 
the new empire, and William was proclaimed emperor in the 
throne-room of the French kings at Versailles. Practically 
from the same moment date the Third Republic in France, 
which rose from the ashes of the war, and the United King  
dom of Italy, with its capital a t  Rome. T h e  dream of the 
dead Cavour was now fulfilled. 
I t  seems entirely probable that the influence of impersonal 
economic forces would have brought about the unification of 
Germany in the course of time, without any wars a t  all. 
Maassen with his Zollverein, rather than Bismarck, was the 
real architect of the empire. Railroads, racial likeness, 
trade, were the fundamental bonds rather than the armies of 
Von Moltke. But Bismarck had undoubtedly hastened the 
process and very profoundly modified the spirit of (he new 
empire. In that sense he might well regard himself as the 
father of his country. 
When he was an old man, Bismarck grew reminiscent and 
gave to  the world the two volumes of his “Reflections and 
Reminiscences,” which proved almost as embarrassing to  the 
Foreign Office a t  Berlin as the more recent reminiscences of 
Prince Lichnowsky. As a historical source, this book is very 
hard to use. There are constant veiled allusions to secret 
transactions which will not be fully known until the archives 
of the various European capitals are opened to inspection. 
I t  is, also, almost impossible to tell just where the reminis- 
cences change into reflections of a later day. But as a mirror 
in which a great modern Machiavelli reveals his political 
opinions and motives, and as a study in diplomacy these 
memoirs have unrivalled interest. No one else can ever 
write a character sketch of the great German that may 
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compete with the one which he himself has written. A t  once 
his strength and his weakness lay in the fact that he could 
act with one single aim constantly in mind. T h a t  aim was 
to  secure the greatness and the strength of Germany. H e  
is the supreme embodiment of the idea of nationality a t  the 
moment when it was changing into the newer idea of imperi- 
alism, T h e  nation must be not only strong itself, but also 
stronger and more powerful than any rival o r  combination 
of rivals. T h e  petty scruples which other men felt o r  pro- 
fessed to  feel, this new Jove was able to  tear aside like 
clouds which dimmed his vision of the world. H e  reckoned 
with democracy, but did not fear it, as his predecessor Met- 
ternich had done; for  he thought that the people would 
always accept national power and efficiency as worthy sub- 
stitutes for  what they thought was liberty. H e  introduced 
universal suffrage in the choice of the Reichstag, though he 
regarded it as a necessary evil. “I had no hesitation what- 
ever in throwing into the fryingpan . , . the most powerful 
ingredient known at that time to liberty-mongers, namely, 
universal suffrage, so as to  frighten off foreign monarchies 
from trying to  stick a finger into our national omelette. I 
never doubted that the German people would be strong and 
clever enough to free themselves from the existing suffrage 
as soon as they realized that it was a harmful institution.” 
In diplomacy his masterpiece was the device by which he 
brought on the war with France at  the very moment when 
he was best ready for it. H e  managed to do this in such a 
way that it seemed to many that France was herself the 
aggressor. Until the publication of his own memoirs such a 
notion existed widely. All doubts on the subject were cleared 
up when Bismarck told the story of his achievement, with all 
the father’s pride over this child of his imagination. Let us 
hope that some day either Bethmann-Hollweg or  William 
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may be equally reminiscent. Bismarck tells us that at the 
beginning of his career, “I took it as assured that war  with 
France would necessarily have to  be waged on the road to  
our further national development, . . . and that we must 
keep this eventuality in sight in all our domestic as well as 
in our foreign relations.” H e  did keep this plan in mind 
through all the intervening years. Finally the throne of 
Spain became vacant, and Bismarck secretly worked to have 
a Hohenzollern prince chosen for  the place. France felt 
that she was threatened from the south, and naturally pro- 
tested. Under the influence of the Empress, she even went 
farther and foolishly asked a pledge that Germany should 
never in the future attempt to control the throne of Spain. 
Bismarck was delighted. W a r  seemed about to come, and 
Prussia was ready. A sharp refusal to the request of 
France was all that was necessary to make that state seem 
the aggressor. But William did not want to take the risk 
and was really anxious for peace. H e  answered the French 
ambassador in a courteous note which would have made war 
impossible. This  letter was the so-called Ems despatch, 
which was not given to the world until after the revelations 
of Bismarck made it necessary. 
There is a wonderful picture in the “Reminiscences,” sub- 
ject for some future painter. H e  might call it, “The Found- 
ing of the German Empire.” Bismarck, Von Roon, the 
minister of war, and Moltke were sitting waiting for the 
news. T h e  king’s pacific telegram was handed to Bismarck. 
H e  read it out to his two guests, whose dejection was so 
great that they turned away from food and drink. Bismarck 
seemed to think that this’,indicated very deep sorrow. But 
as the chancellor looked at  the words with practised eye, 
he thought he saw a gleam of light. “I put a few questions 
to Moltke as to the extent of his confidence in the state of 
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our preparations.” T h e  general answered that everything 
was ready. “Under this conviction,” Bismarck continues, 
“I made use of the royal authorization . . . to publish the 
contents of the telegram; and in the presence of my two 
guests, I reduced the telegram by striking out words, but 
without adding o r  altering. . . , After I had read out the 
concentrated edition to  my two guests, Moltke remarked : 
‘Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; 
now it is like a flourish in answer to  a challenge.’ I went on 
to explain: ‘If ,  in execution of his Majesty’s order, I at  once 
communicate this text . . . not only to  the newspapers, but 
also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in 
Paris before midnight, and, not only on account of its con- 
tents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, 
will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight 
we must if we do not want to act the part  of the vanquished 
without a battle. . . . I t  is important that we should be the 
party attacked.’ This explanation brought about in the two 
generals a revulsion to  a more joyous mood, the liveliness of 
which surprised me. They had suddenly recovered their 
pleasure in eating and drinking and spoke in a more cheerful 
vein. Roon said, ‘Our God of old still lives and will not let 
us perish in disgrace.’ Moltke so fa r  relinquished his pas- 
sive equanimity, that, glancing up joyously to the ceiling and 
abandoning his usual punctiliousness of speech, he smote his 
hand upon his breast and said: ‘If I may but live to  lead 
our armies into such a war, then the devil may come directly 
afterwards and fetch away the old carcass.’ H e  was less 
robust a t  that time than afterwards, and doubted whether 
he should survive the hardships of the campaign.” So, hav- 
ing called upon both God and the devil, this famous party 
adjourned. I t  had changed the history of the world. 
At  the end of the war Moltke summed up the situation in 
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a prophetic sentence: “We have earned in the late war 
respect, but hardly love. Wha t  we have gained by arms in 
six months, we shall have to defend by arms for fifty years.” 
With France defeated, it was necessary for Bismarck to  
consolidate his gains. H e  foresaw a great struggle be- 
tween what he callkd the system of order on a monarchical 
basis and the social republic to  which that principle might be 
reduced. H e  considered the establishment of strong royal 
institutions on permanent foundations in Germany, Russia, 
and Austria more important than any rivalry “over the frag- 
ments of nations which inhabit the Balkan peninsula.” I n  
comparison with the safety and the strength of the great 
monarchies, it seemed to  him that “all the Balkans were 
not worth one Pomeranian grenadier.” France was hope- 
lessly given over to idols, and he would let her alone. H e  
favored the establishment of a republic there, because he 
thought that the end of the experiment would be an anarchy 
entirely favorable to  Germany. Her friendship he could 
never hope to secure. H e r  weakness would be the best safe- 
guard. Austria, too, had been defeated and one might ex- 
pect at first sight that she also would be an irreconcilable 
enemy. But she feared internal troubles even more than she 
hated her conquerors, whose terms, by the foresight of Bis- 
marck, had been generous. She had been displaced in Ger- 
many, but she had paid no indemnity and had lost no terri- 
tory. H e r  wounds, unlike those of France, were healing 
without a scar. There had arisen in Austria a statesman of 
great ability in the person of Julius Andrassy. Andrassy 
was a Hungarian who had been exiled for his part  in the 
defeated revolution of I 84s. H e  had been allowed to return 
after ten years in Paris, had gained the ear of Francis 
Joseph, and after the terrible defeat of the Austrian armies 
in Bohemia he had written and secured the adoption of the 
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present remarkable constitution of the dual monarchy, which 
distributes the national power between the Magyars and the 
Germans, to  the practical exclusion of the Slavic elements in 
the population. Andrassy constantly argued that the future 
of Austria lay in the East,  and that her expulsion from Italy 
and Germany had been real blessings in disguise. 
Under these circumstances the three emperors met in Ber- 
lin the year after the defeat of France, and made an informal 
league in which they agreed to work together to repress the 
revolutionary movements in Europe, to maintain the new 
conquests of Germany, and to  settle the problems which 
might arise in the Balkans. 
Bismarck saw at once the weak point in this agreement. 
T h e  three emperors were at  one in their common fear of 
Socialism and Revolution ; they might even help him to hold 
Alsace and Lorraine. But the Russian and the Austrian 
could not both dominate the Balkans at  the same time. I t  
never occurred to any one that the course of true statesman- 
ship, in the long run, would be to  leave the Balkans to their 
own peoples without any outside domination. Did the Iron 
Chancellor really expect to  be able to  drive this strange and 
unruly team in safety over the rough road of imperial 
rivalry? W a s  the league hollow from the very beginning, 
and had Bismarck already chosen one of the partners for his 
especial favor? These are questions which we cannot an- 
swer. But it is now well known that in 1 8 7 5 ,  at the time of 
the mysterious war scare of that year, and again twice in 
1876, when Alexander was seeking the assurance of a free 
hand against Turkey, Bismarck offered support to  Russia in 
return for a guarantee of Alsace and Lorraine. Russia was 
virtually told that she might have the aid of Prussia i f  she 
would consent to abandon France. 
Did Bismarck intend these offers sincerely? Did he ever 
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expect them to be considered or  accepted, even at  the cost of 
Austria? One would be bold, indeed, to answer at all dog- 
matically. But it seems very probable that he expected 
Alexander to  refuse, a t  least when the offer was repeated 
the second and the third time. H e  wanted the friendship of 
both Austria and Russia, but when he had to choose, he 
definitely and very early chose Austria. William was always 
sincerely friendly to Russia. H e  had meant what he said 
when he had written to  Alexander after the war with France : 
“Prussia will never forget that she owes it to you that the 
war did not assume the most extreme dimensions. May  
God bless you for it!” Bismarck needed to prove to  his 
master, and perhaps even to himself, that, the friendship of 
Russia was a broken reed. Russia would never allow France 
to be completely crushed. And so, in 1877, Bismarck 
allowed it to  be known that Prussia would fight on the side 
of Austria i f  necessary. From that moment, at least, the 
so-called League of the Three Emperors was a hollow sham 
which needed nothing but a sharp crisis to sweep it away. I t  
rested on nothing more substantial than the personal friend- 
ship of two monarchs. T h e  chancellor had taken the Czar  
of all the Russias on an imperial snipe-hunt and left him 
holding the sack. This is the real key to the policy of Bis- 
marck at  the Congress of Berlin.1 
Why  did Bismarck choose Austria instead of Russia for 
his ally? H e  recognized the potential power of a great 
empire like Russia. H e  felt genuine sympathy for her abso- 
lute government. T h e  two states had a common interest in 
their respective shares of dismembered Poland. But, in 
spite of the possible friction on account of the religious ques- 
tion, there were more points of contact with Austria. T h e  
1 For a recent and somewhat different interpretation, see Coolidge, (‘The 
Origins of the Triple Alliance.” 
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dominant part  of the Austrian population was German, and 
would be bound to Germany by the strong bonds of kinship 
and of language. In Hungary, Bismarck could count on the 
Magyars even more certainly, on account of their fear of  
the Slavs by whom they were surrounded. T h e  alliance with 
Russia depended too much on a single pair of eyes; it was as 
uncertain as the changing moods of the Czar. Wi th  pro- 
phetic insight, Bismarck foresaw the dangerous instability 
of that alliance, and so finally chose Austria. Events seem 
to have proved the wisdom of the choice. I t  was in this 
connection that he said: “All contracts between great states 
cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested 
by the struggle for existence.’’ When he went to  Vienna to  
make the formal alliance with Austria, he was received with 
great enthusiasm by the crowds, and felt that the German 
sympathies of the Austrians “had been overlaid but not 
extinguished by the ddbris deposited by the struggles of the 
past” ( I 8 7 9 ) .  
At the time of which we are speaking, just before the out- 
break of the war between Russia and Turkey, a very remark- 
able old man of seventy had just achieved the ambition for  
which he had worked since he was a youth of twenty-two. 
Benjamin Disraeli had become at  last the prime minister of 
England. T h e  rise of Disraeli to  power illustrates one of 
the fundamental weaknesses of the parliamentary form of 
government. Modern constitutional governments are of one 
of two kinds. They are either Presidential, like that of the 
United States, in which the executive holds office directly 
from the people for a given term of years, o r  Parliamentary, 
in which the executive power is entrusted to a committee of 
the Legislature for an indefinite length of time. I n  ordinary 
times the committee scheme works well enough, and cer- 
tainly has the advantage of flexibility. There is small chance 
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for a dictatorship. But in times of emergency there is almost 
always friction and waste of time and energy. Men are 
debating when they should be acting, and the constant neces- 
sity of appealing to Parliament tends to bring to  power men 
who are first of all great debaters and clever parliamentary 
tacticians. Especially before the days of the last Reform 
Bill, a man might easily dominate the House of Commons 
without really understanding either his own country or the 
affairs of Europe. T h e  appeal which will win the ear of the 
House is not necessarily the broad, generous appeal which 
will be sanctioned by the people. 
Disraeli understood the House individually and collec- 
tively better, perhaps, than any man since Chatham. A keen 
observer has said that he “played upon it as he would have 
played upon a musical instrument, and it answered to  his 
touch.” When he appeared for his first speech he was 
described as attired in “a bottle-green frock coat and a vest 
of white, the front of which exhibited a network of glittering 
chains; large fancy pattern pantaloons, and a black tie, above 
which no shirt collar was visible.” His  face was very pale, 
in sharp contrast to his coal-black eyes. H i s  forehead was 
broad and low, overhung with clustering ringlets of coal- 
black hair. T h e  fastidious House received this strange 
speaker with shouts of laughter. A t  last he paused in the 
midst of a sentence, and looking indignantly a t  his oppo- 
nents, raised his hands and shouted, “I have begun several 
times many things, and I have often succeeded at last; ay, 
sir, and though I sit down now, the time will come when you 
will hear me.” And the time did come. Disraeli could sit 
for hours listening to the most bitter denunciation of  him- 
self and his policies without a change in a muscle of his face, 
showing only by an occasional gleam of his half-shut eyes 
that he heard what was said. O’Connell once called him “a 
The Congress of Berlin 109 
miscreant, a wretch, a liar whose life is a living lie; the heir 
a t  law of the blasphemous thief who died impenitent on the 
cross!” But the House came to admire a man who could 
meet such blows without wincing. T h e  instinct of fair play, 
admiration for his astonishing cleverness in debate, the ten- 
dency to appraise a man at his own valuation, had much to  
do with Disraeli’s rise to power. 
T h e  very frankness of his cynicism, the mere honesty of 
his ambitions, had in them a certain refreshing quality. On 
one occasion he said to  John Bright as the two took their 
umbrellas in the cloak-room, “After all, what is it that brings 
you and me here? Fame! I might have occupied a literary 
throne, but I have renounced it for this career. This is the 
true arena.” And in his quest for fame, he knew how to 
be generous to  his friends and dangerous to his enemies. H e  
had at once the aloofness and the supreme courage and 
perseverance of his race. Men always admire a man who 
does not fear them, and who rises supreme above all ob- 
stacles to the place,which he has chosen for himself, who 
meets contempt with still deeper contempt, and who looks 
disaster in the face with a smile. Such a man was Benjamin 
Disraeli. 
Like Chatham, Disraeli was always something of an actor. 
In  one of his novels he represents the hero explaining to his 
father why he had left college: “Because they taught me 
words, and I wished to  learn ideas.” T h e  father answers 
with worldly wisdom, “Few ideas are correct ones, and what 
are correct no one can ascertain, but with words we govern 
men.” Disraeli always acted on this principle, and used 
words to conceal his meaning. In  one speech, when hard 
pressed by a questioner, he said that he was “in favor of 
popular privileges, but opposed to  democratic rights.” 
1 Bryce, “Biographical Studies,” p. 30. 
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After his return from the Congress of Berlin, which had 
torn away some of the richest provinces of the Turkish 
empire, he said that the purpose of the powers had been 
“not dismemberment, but consolidation.” But when the 
Greeks tried the same sovereign method of “consolidation” 
for  the growing ills of Turkey, Disraeli saw to it that they 
were compelled to  stop in their purpose of conquest. 
H e  became the leader of his party a t  the time when Peel 
accepted the doctrine of free trade, “stealing the clothes of 
the Liberals when they were in bathing,” as Disraeli said. 
Later he had done much the same thing himself when he 
became the sponsor of the Reform Bill of 1867, which the 
Liberals had long been urging without success. This bill 
gave the suffrage to the workingmen in the cities. Many 
thought that it sounded the knell of the Conservative party. 
But the Tory  leader saw, with characteristic shrewdness, 
that i f  a reform bill had to be passed, it was better to be the 
victor than the defeated party. T h e  workingmen could be 
held by constant appeals to their patriotism. 
At  last the supreme political opportunity came when 
Gladstone pursued a peaceful policy in foreign affairs. The  
Liberal prime minister submitted the Alabama controversy 
to arbitration, much to the disgust of the Tories;  and when 
the court decided the case against England and imposed a 
penalty of $15,000,000, he defended his action in words 
which are still memorable: “Although I may think the sen- 
tence was harsh in its extent and unjust in its basis, I regard 
the fine imposed on this country as dust in the balance com- 
pared with the moral value of the example set when these 
two great nations of  England and America went in peace 
and concord before a judicial tribunal rather than resort to  
the arbitrament of the sword.” But for the moment passions 
were inflamed, and the English people were disappointed, 
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and Disraeli became prime minister in 1874 on a platform 
in which he promised to  uphold the ancient monarchy of 
England, to  elevate the social condition of the people, and 
above all to maintain the empire. I t  does sometimes seem, 
as Disraeli had said, that men are governed by words. T h e  
new government was sure to have what is called a strong 
foreign policy. 
T h e  prime minister had been especially interested in the 
East  ever since he had travelled in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean as a young man. H e  loved to speak of England as an 
Asiatic power. H e  had a genuine and often expressed ad- 
miration for the Turks,  as was only natural since their 
treatment of the Jews had been better than of any other of 
the subject races, and since their treatment by Russia has 
always been a blot on the Russian name. H e  had no real 
knowledge of conditions in southeastern Europe, where the 
Christian populations were suffering under the most oppres- 
sive tyranny, with heavy taxes and no semblance of personal 
o r  religious liberty. T h e  prime minister always posed as a 
wizard whose statements concealed some weighty plan which 
he was not quite at liberty to disclose. H e  wished to be 
thought inscrutable. Beneath his picture a t  the Conservative 
Club was written the line of Homer,  “ H e  alone is wise; all 
the rest are fleeting shadows.” H e  loved dramatic surprises, 
and understood their political value. T h e  year after his 
accession, a lucky chance gave him the very opportunity 
which he needed. T h e  Suez Canal had been completed in 
I 869-by a curious coincidence, the same year with the com- 
pletion of the first transcontinental railroad in the United 
States. It had been built under a hundred-year concession 
to a French company, and the Khedive of Egypt had re- 
ceived 176,000 of the 400,000 shares as his reward. Egypt 
had prospered as long as the war lasted in the United States. 
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She had sold her cotton at fabulous prices, and the rich plant- 
ers in the valley of the Nile had even been able to afford ex- 
pensive and beautiful Abyssinian and Circassian wives. The  
debt of the little state had risen thirty times in five years, for 
the Khedive thought that the good times would last forever. 
Then the war had ended, and within ten years Egypt had 
lost her cotton business and was at  the doors of bankruptcy. 
One realizes how closely connected are all historical events 
when we think that the English possession of the Suez Canal 
and of Egypt is a by-product of the American Civil War .  
An enterprising English newspaperman learned that the 
ruler of Egypt was about to  sell his shares to the French. 
H e  came one night to Lord Derby, foreign minister in the 
cabinet of Disraeli, and urged him to buy them for England. 
I t  was a startling suggestion to  the cautious Derby. Parlia- 
ment was not in session. N o  money had been appropriated 
for such a purpose. But he promised to take the matter up 
with the prime minister. Disraeli telegraphed at  once and 
asked the consul a t  Cairo to inquire directly whether the 
shares were in the market. T h e  Khedive answered, “Yes.” 
Disraeli secured the necessary money from an English 
banker, and before night the bargain was completed. When 
Parliament met he could announce that England had ac- 
quired a controlling interest in the Suez Canal for $4,000,- 
ooo sterling. To-day those shares are paying twenty-five 
per cent. on the original investment, and are quoted at 
~30,000,000, but of course they are really priceless. 
Only two other men could ever claim to have picked up 
such bargains a t  the remnant counter of the world. T h e  
first was Livingston, into whose feeble hands Napoleon 
thrust the half-welcome Louisiana, with its area of bound- 
less wealth, for $15,000,000; and the second was Seward, 
to  whom Alexander of Russia had just sold Alaska for  the 
The Congress of Berlin 113 
paltry sum of $7,200,000. T h e  mystery man had proved a 
wizard. 
H i s  next move was equally characteristic. On January I ,  
1877, Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India, amid 
booming cannon and shouting crowds at a great durbar in 
the city of a hundred kings, under the massive walls of 
imperial Delhi. But imperialism has its gloomy side, and 
famine was at  that moment stalking on her grim business 
among the villages of the land of the five rivers. T o  a starv- 
ing people all the pomp of Delhi seemed only a pale and 
hollow sham. 
In  Europe the eyes of men were on the Balkans. Fierce 
revolt against intolerable misrule had blazed up slowly in 
Bosnia, at the extreme west of the dominions of the Sultan. 
Did Bismarck and Andrassy, o r  did the Pan-Slavists of 
Moscow, have anything directly to  do with the revolt? W e  
shall not know until the archives are fully opened. In any 
case, there was reason enough for the revolt without any out- 
side assistance, and it might be made to serve either Austria 
or Russia, and perhaps, for the moment, both. T h e  powers 
listened to the appeals which came to them out of the East  
and made half-hearted efforts to secure a measure of redress 
for the oppressed peoples of the Balkans. First came the 
Andrassy note, in which all the powers joined; then a note 
from the three emperors at Berlin, which the British Gov- 
ernment refused to support. T h e  threat of Europe was that 
i f  the Sultan refused to  come to terms they would deliberate 
again. T h e  result was what one might expect. T h e  Sultan, 
encouraged by the attitude of the powers, and remembering 
especially the very present help in time of trouble which had 
come to him in the days of the Crimeari war, assumed more 
and more an air of injured innocence. Especially after a 
palace revolution had driven the weak Abdul Aziz from the 
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throne to suicide, and when the imbecile boy Murad was in 
turn succeeded by his utterly cruel brother, Abdul Hamid, 
the chances for any internal reform were clearly gone, though 
Disraeli would not believe it. Then Servia and Montenegro 
declared war and fought with the greatest courage under a 
Russian general. But the odds were too great, and they were 
beaten hopelessly, and saved from annihilation only by the 
action of the powers. 
One spring morning in 1876,  the papers published a story 
of terrible atrocities among the villages of Bulgaria. T h e  
Turk  was protecting his flank against any sudden attack. 
And he was doing it with almost modern thoroughness and 
efficiency. This  was the despatch which the people of the 
world read over their coffee that morning: “In Constanti- 
nople nobody hesitates to  believe that many thousands of 
innocent men, women, and children have been slaughtered ; 
that a t  least sixty villages have been utterly destroyed ; that 
the most terrible acts of violence have been committed; and 
that a district among the most fertile in Europe has been 
ruined for many years to  come.” T h e  villagers had been 
invited to give up their arms on promise of immunity, and 
had then been slaughtered in cold blood. Twelve hundred 
had been burned to  death in one church. I t  was a great 
massacre,-not Abdul Hamid’s masterpiece, for in the 
Armenian massacres of I 896 the most conservative accounts 
place the deaths at IOO,OOO, but still, so near to a critical 
Europe, quite satisfactory for  the purpose in hand. Dis- 
raeli was politely incredulous, even after the worst details 
had been confirmed by his own agents. H e  labelled all this 
talk, “Coffee-house babble,” and said on the floor of the 
House, in answer to a question, that the stories could not be 
true. H e  knew the East, and Eastern people did not torture 
their victims. They used more expeditious means. H e  was 
evidently pleased at  the laugh which this sally brought out. 
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Sir Henry Elliot, the British ambassador at Constantinople, 
telegraphed: “British interests are not concerned in the 
question whether ten or twenty thousand perished in the 
insurrection.” 
But this was not the heart of England speaking. I believe 
it is always true that if secret diplomacy could be abolished, 
and the essential truth in any international situation could 
be presented fairly to  any great people without deception, 
they would always answer for the generous policy, against 
the narrow claims of self-interest. T h e  difficulty is to avoid 
deception, and to  keep the subject before them until they can 
express their will in action. A t  least it was so in this case. 
Gladstone emerged from his literary retirement with his 
“Bulgarian Pamphlet,” which fired the heart of the common 
people of England and made it impossible for the cabinet 
to intervene at once in favor of Turkey against Russia, as 
they had done at  the time of the Crimean war. H e  ad- 
dressed great crowds everywhere. T h e  historian Freeman 
expressed the liberal thought of the country when he said, 
“Perish the interests of England, perish our dominion in  
India, sooner than that we should strike one blow or  speak 
one word on behalf of the wrong against the right.” Glad- 
stone linew that he would be voted down in the House of 
Commons, that even some of his own party were against him, 
“but he looked beyond unity to principle, and beyond the 
House of Commons to the nation.” H e  presented resolu- 
tions in which he declared that Turkey had lost her right of 
assistance, moral o r  material ; he pronounced for local self- 
government in the disturbed provinces, and urged the impo- 
sition of guarantees by the Concert of Europe. Gladstone’s 
speech in defence of these resolutions was probably the 
climax of a great career.l H i s  opponents had used dilatory 
tactics, so that he did not manage to  secure the floor until seven 
Morley’s “Gladstone,” 11, 566. 
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in the evening. H e  rose to  speak before a listless House 
whose members were streaming out to dinner. But he held 
them and moved them, and what was more, he gained the ear 
of the country, so that any repetition of the blunders of the 
Crimean war was now impossible. T h e  old man was now 
sixty-eight, but he spoke for  two hours and a half with 
undiminished vigor: “Sir, there were other days when E n g  
land was the hope of freedom. Wherever in the world a 
high aspiration was entertained, o r  a noble blow was struck, 
it was to England that the eyes of the oppressed were always 
turned. . . . You talk to me of the established tradition and 
policy in regard to Turkey. I appeal to an established tradi- 
tion older, wider, nobler far-a tradition not which disre- 
gards British interests, but which teaches you to  seek the 
promotion of these interests in obeying the dictates of honor 
and justice.’’ H e  went on to  describe in passionate but 
restrained language the wrongs against which he was pro- 
testing, “I believe, for  one, that the knell of Turkish 
tyranny in these provinces has sounded. . . . T h e  destruc- 
tion may not come in the way or  by the means that we should 
choose; but come this boon from what hands it may, it will 
be a noble boon, and as a noble boon will gladly be accepted 
by Christendom and the world.” T h e  twelve thousand 
Bulgarian peasants who had died defenceless in their vil- 
lages had unwittingly performed a greater task for their 
country than i f  they had died armed upon the field of battle. 
Even Disraeli could not quite laugh Gladstone down when 
he called him “a sophistical rhetorician inebriated with the 
exuberance of his own verbosity.” 
T h e  Bulgarian massacres had made war between Russia 
and Turkey practically inevitable, though events moved 
slowly, and it was clear that Alexander did not want the war 
and would have been perfectly satisfied if the powers had 
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taken from his shoulders the task of improving the condi- 
tions in Turkey. H e  remembered well the results of the 
Crimean war, and he knew that Russia was no more ready 
now than then. H e r  financial condition was alarming, and 
with each new conquest in Central Asia her deficits increased. 
She had sold Alaska for this reason and because she feared 
that it might fall into the hands of England. H e r  army had 
been reorganized two years before by the adoption of the 
system of universal military service, but it was too early yet 
to  reap the fruits of this change. Above all, Austria was 
watching from the heights of the Carpathians, and the Brit- 
ish fleet was near the mouth of the Dardanelles. But the 
pressure of the Russian people, and his own sympathies, 
were too strong to permit a policy of inaction in the face of 
almost certain continuation of the massacres. H e  sought an 
interview with Francis Joseph, and promised not to  oppose 
him in his evident desire for Bosnia. H e  gave his word of 
honor to  the English minister that he would not seize Con- 
stantinople. H e  made an agreement which was virtually an 
alliance with Roumania. And then he waited with remark- 
able patience for the result of the conference of the powers 
which had been called to meet in Constantinople. T h e  Sul- 
tan promised to introduce a parliament into the government 
of Turkey, and one actually met with all the usual features 
except the important one of an opposition. Abdul Hamid 
expressed surprise that the powers did not recognize “the 
principles of equality and justice which the imperial govern- 
ment was seeking to introduce into its internal administra- 
tion.” I t  was evident that all hope of a peaceful solution 
was at an end, and the soldiers of  Russia moved south across 
Roumania on what has been rightly called the most just and 
necessary war of the nineteenth century. 
Again, as in the previous war, the peasant soldiers fought 
118 Nineteenth Century Peace Congresses 
with supreme courage and devotion. There  can be no ques- 
tion that they saw in the Bulgarian peasants brothers whom 
they were sent to  save. Fo r  once the other nations of the 
Balkans laid aside their petty jealousies, and the Servians 
reentered the war and rendered valiant service side by side 
with the Russians and the Roumanians. T h e  Russians 
crossed the Danube at Sistova. Their  commander stood on 
an island in the river watching them as they stormed the 
lofty southern bank. Skobeleff, the hero of the Russian 
advance into Central Asia, stood beside him as he peered out 
through the mist of the early morning. “I congratulate you 
on your victory,” he said to  Dragomiroff. “Where do you 
see that?” asked Dragomiroff. “Where? On  the faces of 
your soldiers. Watch them as they charge the enemyl”1 
But, in spite of courage, the war was long and costly, and 
proved again the complete inefficiency of the administrative 
system of the Russian Empire. At  length Plevna had 
yielded to Todleben, the hero of Sevastopol, and the Russian 
cavalry swept down through the passes of the lofty Balkans 
on Adrianople, just as the soldiers of Nicholas had done 
fifty years before. Wi th  the fall of Plevna, Disraeli’s fears 
for Constantinople were redoubled. But England had no 
soldiers a t  hand. “HOW long will it take to reach Adri- 
anople?” he asked his military adviser. “About four 
weeks,” was the answer. “Give me six and I can do some- 
thing.” As it was, the English fleet sailed into the Sea of  
Marmora as the Russian soldiers approached the walls of 
the long-coveted city. Bismarck said the world was likely 
to see a war between a whale and an elephant. 
T h e  Czar  imposed peace upon the beaten Sultan under 
the walls of his capital. This was the famous treaty of San 
Stefano, which has been called the wisest plan for the solu- 
1 Rose, “The Development of European Nations,” p. 234. 
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tion of the Eastern Question that has ever been devised. 
T h e  Sultan agreed to make Bulgaria an independent state 
which should stretch from the Black Sea to the boun- 
daries of Albania, and from the Danube to the E g e a n .  
Servia was to be given the districts of Nish and Novibazar, 
and little Montenegro was to have a port on the Adriatic. 
Russia was to have an indemnity and to annex the regions 
in Armenia which she had conquered from the Turks. There  
was only one serious injustice in the treaty-that Roumania 
was to give up to Russia the desirable land which she held 
north of  the Danube and accept instead the marshy and 
undesirable Dobrudja. This was poor return for  valiant 
aid. T h e  Servian ambitions were also sacrificed to the neces- 
sity of giving unwilling Bosnia to the undeserving Austrian. 
T h e  other arrangements of the treaty were based on the best 
information then available, and seemed likely to secure as 
just and abiding a peace as could reasonably be hoped. 
Austria and England immediately objected, fearing too 
great Russian influence in the Balkans, and a congress of the 
powers was called to meet at Berlin, under the presidency of 
Bismarck, to reconsider the terms of the treaty. T h e  Con- 
gress of Berlin met, therefore, to compel the victorious 
power to yield the fruit of victory to  outsiders who had had 
no part  in the contest. In  that respect it was different from 
any congress in the history of the world, and was the high- 
water mark of the Concert of Nations. I t  suggests the 
extent to which a united world may succeed against any 
single member. In  this case, it is true, the common bond 
was certainly one of organized selfishness. In some later 
congress we may hope that the same method may be used fo r  
wiser and more generous purposes. 
In  contrast with the previous congress, each of the states 
was represented by its ablest men. There may have been an 
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exception in the case of Turkey, which was represented, a t  
least according to  Bismarck, “by an imbecile, a renegade, and 
a Greek,” but that made little difference, for even the ablest 
diplomacy would scarcely have served to save her from her 
friends. Herbert  Paul has said that “if Disraeli, now Lord 
Beaconsfield, had been the envoy of the Sultan instead of the 
Queen, he would have deserved a gold statue for his labors 
a t  Berlin.” But to  dismembered Turkey even this praise 
would doubtless seem too generous. T h e  chief representa- 
tive of Russia was the aged Gortchakoff, now more than 
eighty years of age, who had to  be carried in to the sittings 
of the congress, but whose mental vigor was unimpaired. 
H i s  fotmer friendship with Bismarck had changed to  hatred 
when Russia had averted the possibility of a great war in 
1875, and Gortchakoff had claimed all the credit in the 
famous message, “Peace is now assured.” Andrassy, the 
Hungarian, was a striking figure, with his coal-black hair 
and eyes, set off by a scarlet uniform. H e  spent his leisure 
time at Berlin in driving a hard bargain with little Servia, 
which practically delivered the railroads of that country into 
the hands of Austria. 
In this congress there was little of social pomp, and it is 
said that the people of Berlin scarcely knew that anything 
unusual was going on. T h e  meetings were businesslike 
sessions in which Bismarck, whose health was none too good, 
pushed matters along as rapidly as possible. His  brusque- 
ness, good humor, and rough tact helped to soften the differ- 
ences which arose, o r  else to  sweep them aside. H e  tells 
us that he had to drink a jug of port before the meetings to  
keep himself alert, and the other members did not hesitate 
to take advantage of the famous hospitality of his buffet. 
Most of these heated discussions were sham battles, for  
Disraeli came to  the congress armed with three secret agree- 
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ments which really settled all the essential points a t  issue in 
his favor. H e  had one with Russia, in which that reluctant 
power had agreed to  the division of Bulgaria into three 
parts, Macedonia to be left to  the tender mercies of the Sul- 
tan. H e  had another with Turkey, in which that state prom- 
ised to  reward the services of England by the cession of 
Cyprus and by accepting England as the protector of her 
Asiatic territory. H e  also had one with Austria, in which 
he agreed to  let her take Bosnia, for Beaconsfield did not 
realize that he was building up a new rival to  replace the 
old. With these three papers in his pocket, it is perfectly 
plain that the astute old gentleman was playing with loaded 
dice; but he was enough of an actor to keep up the’appear- 
ance of the greatest fervor over questions which he knew 
perfectly well were already settled. On one occasion he even 
ordered a special train to be in readiness to take him away 
i f  he did not gain a really unimportant point for which he 
was contending. H e  had an eye always upon the crowds at  
home and the necessity of making them feel that he was 
winning famous diplomatic victories. H e  had one moment 
of embarrassment, for a dishonest clerk carried his agree- 
ment with Turkey, which ceded Cyprus to  England, to one 
of the newspapers, and it was published just before a great 
reception for the congress. Disraeli arrived late at the recep- 
tion, and passed from group to  group with the same inscru- 
table expression. T h e  various diplomats were very angry, 
especially the Russians, who felt that they had been duped. 
A Russian princess finally had the courage to  ask, “What  
are you thinking about, my lord?” (All the rest were think- 
ing of Cyprus.) “Madam,” answered the old man, with a 
courtly bow, “I am not thinking of anything; I am enjoying 
myself.” 
1 Princess Radziwill, “My Recollections,” p. 149. 
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“Punch” represented the English prime minister in those 
days, “arriving with a large military escort, keeping an iron- 
clad on the Spree, attending with cocked hat, brass band, and 
revolvers, entering singing, ‘We don’t want to fight, but by 
jingo, if we do,’ drawing caricatures of the Emperor of 
Russia on the blottingpaper, and waving the Union Jack 
continually over the head of the President.” And, spiritu- 
ally, there was a certain degree of truth in these pictures; 
but, outwardly, Beaconsfield was a master of diplomacy. 
Those who were there agree that he spoke seldom and al- 
ways to  the point, knew what he wanted, and never wavered 
even when his demands led straight to war. Bismarck said 
with his’usual bluntness, “Der  alte Jude, das ist der mann!” 
There was real spiritual kinship between those two remark- 
able old men. 
Wha t  was going on behind the scenes of this assembly? 
I t  is very probable that whatever it was counted fully as 
much in the final result as anything which took place at the 
more formal meetings around Bismarck’s table. I t  is a t  
least certain that a great deal of generosity was displayed in 
offering other people’s property. I t  was Bismarck’s evident 
policy to sow as much discord as possible among all his po- 
tential rivals. H e  certainly joined with Salisbury in urging 
France to seize Tunis, greatly coveted by Italy, thereby 
laying sure foundations for the future Triple Alliance. In  
the same spirit, he urged England to proceed with the occu- 
pation of Egypt, a step which would certainly cause friction 
with France, thereby isolating his chief enemy from her two 
possible friends, Italy and England. Salisbury probably 
suggested to  Italy the step which was accomplished only 
1 Lord, “The  Congress of Berlin,’’ p. 5 5 .  
2 Bryce, “Biographical Studies,” p. 54. 
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yesterday, the occupation of Tripoli. When Disraeli ad- 
dressed the waiting crowds from the window of Whitehall 
on his return to London, he told them, in famous though 
borrowed phrase, that he was bringing them “Peace, with 
honor” I I t  seems that he might better have summed up the 
spirit of the assembly in which he had played so prominent 
a part  i f . h e  had said that he brought them “Peace, with 
Cyprus” ! 
What  shall we say of the final results of this congress of 
great men? T h e  affairs of the Balkans and of the East 
might be settled in either of two ways, to meet the imme- 
diate needs and prejudices of the great powers, or to secure 
the lasting good of the people who lived in the stricken terri- 
tory. They chose the first rather than the second. T h e  
representatives of the people most concerned were not made 
members of the congress and were listened to only as peti- 
tioners, and that with thinly disguised contempt. Russia, 
England, and Austria each received its pound of flesh, but i n  
the unnatural division of Servia and Bulgaria a smouldering 
fire had been kindled which was to leap into flame in 1912 
and 1913, and finally to sweep the whole world in the mighty 
conflagration of to-day. Much, very much, of the guilt of  
the present war goes back to those men who sat around Bis- 
marck’s table, and who signed the most selfish and irrational 
treaty in recent history on that fateful thirteenth of July, 
1878. Two years later the old man who was the chief au- 
thor of its most important provisions was to retire from the 
stage on which he had played so great a part, saying to his 
colleagues, “You will come back, but I shall not.” T h e  next 
year he was dead. 
One may fitly close this account of the three great peace 
congresses of the nineteenth century with the words of the 
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historian John Richard Green: “The sympathies of peoples 
with peoples, the sense of a common humanity between na- 
tions, the aspirations of  nationalities after freedom and inde- 
pendence, are, after all, real political forces which true 
statesmanship must finally take into account.” 
ROBERT GRANVILLE CALDWELL. 
